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Abstract
The European States, France in particular, faced with several industrial accidents,
like one of the most serious one, the AZF explosion in Toulouse (France) in 2001,
which created the trauma of the stakeholders concerned by the chemical risk,
(industry, authorities and citizen). Learning from this experience, the French Ministry
in charge of the Environment, with the help of INERIS, worked on upgrading its
chemical risks knowledge and studied to improve new methods on risk assessment. In
2004, INERIS was in charge of developing a new approach to classify accidental
scenarios in terms of probability, severity and response time. In this paper, INERIS
proposes a prioritisation based on time of occurrence, of development of hazardous
phenomena and of effects on targets. Then, INERIS shows a method enabling to
integrate, as a second prioritisation criteria, the on-site and off-site response
capabilities/abilities as well as the means for population protection in terms of time
allowed.
Keywords : Land Use Planning ; off-site emergency planning ; chemical accident scenario ;
kinetic
1. Background
The European States, France in particular, faced with several industrial accidents of
various causes and extent. The consequences of technological or chemical disasters
such as those in Flixborough in 1971, or Seveso in 1976 (numerous casualties, major
damage to the environment...), made international authorities to examine these
phenomena and have especially led the European Commission to adopt legislation to
prevent such events.
Two consecutive Directives in 19822then in 1996 3 gave guidance to member States
to develop a prevention policy for major technological risks.
1
 Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques
2
 Council Directive 82/501/EEC of 24 June 1982 on major accident hazards of some industrial activities (Seveso I)
3
 Council Directive 96/82 of 9 December 1996 ( Seveso H)on the controlling of dangers connected with major
accidents involving dangerous substances (modified in December 2003)
The latter Directive was transposed to French law in May 2000: the upgrading of
those installations with possible major technological risks is still being continued
today.
In France, the AZF accident in Toulouse, on 21 September 2001, was truly traumatic
for all stakeholders concerned by chemical risk, from industries operating chemical
plants to administrative decision-makers, not forgetting interest groups and the
citizen.
With reference to these research, and under the scope of the Seveso II Directive, the
French Ministry of the Environment4 (MEDD) set the 2003 act of Law 5on Risks
concerning Technological Risk Prevention Plan (PPRT).
INERIS is the technical support for the MEDD and offers expertise to Industries.
INERIS is the reference body for risk analysis, determination of means to prevent
major technological risks (chemical risks) and associated means of protection for
SEVESO Installations and other fixed installations. INERIS also supports for
authorities and industry for transportation of hazardous substances via pipelines, road,
rail, inland waters, tunnels and port areas.
These facilities are consequently covered in safety reports. They are used to devise
internal and external emergency plans and for prioritising emergency equipment in
the preparation of crisis situations subsequent to chemical accidents.
In 2004, INERIS was in charge of developing a new approach to classify accidental
scenarios in terms of probability, severity and response time.
About response time, INERIS proposed a first prioritisation based on time of
occurrence, of development of hazardous phenomena and of effects on targets. As a
second prioritisation criteria, INERIS showed a method enabling to integrate, the on-
site and off-site response capabilities/abilities as well as the means for population
protection in terms of time allowed.
This approach is compatible with the Methodology for the Identification of Major
Accident Hazards (MIMAH) developed in the ARAMIS Project6.
This paper reviews scenario characteristic used to establish Land Use Planning (LUP)
and off-site emergency plans. Then it identify the difficulties encountered to co-
ordinate LUP and emergency planning. An example of an off-site emergency plan
integrating response time will be presented in the seminar.
4
 Ministère de l'Ecologie et du Développement Durable - MEDD ( Ministry of Ecology and sustainable
development)
5
 Law n°2003-699 (2003, July the 30th) on natural & technological risk prevention
6
 Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries - http://aramis.jrc.it/
2. Definition and conventional analysis of accident scenario kinetic
The kinetic is one of the key elements necessary for classifying the scenarios of
accidents those will be used especially for :
a LUP establishment ;
a Emergency Plans Elaboration.
As a preliminary, we would differentiate the notions of "time" and "duration", insofar
as certain phases can be concomitant (the phases are thus not strictly successive).
Accident scenario kinetic is characterised by a pre-acci dental phase and a post-
accidental phase. The latter is determined by the dangerous phenomenon dynamics
and the exposure of the targets (public, environment).
The pre-accidental kinetic study, duration necessary to lead to the Critical Event
(lost of containment) which corresponds to the time between the Initiating Event
and the release of the potential of hazard is not study in this paper but is integrated in
the Safety Report. We would focus on the characteristics of the post-accidental
kinetic.
On the one hand, it is necessary to distinguish the kinetic from the phenomenon and,
on the other hand, the kinetic from the exposure of the targets. Insofar as the
occurrence of the effect on the targets can, according to cases', being former (for
example for a fire of warehouse) or posterior (for example, for a dispersion of a toxic
substance following a ruin) at the end of the development of the phenomenon. These
four kinetics are thus not necessarily successive.
Hazard phenomenon kinetic is characterised by :
a Occurrence Delay (di) which corresponds for example to the time
needed to the formation of one inflammable cloud in the case of a VCE
O The phenomenon development until its stationary state (di) : for
example with the development of the fire generalised in the case of a
fire of warehouse ;
With regard to the targets, the elements of kinetics are as follows :
• A time (da) necessary to the first physical effect on the target (toxic
cloud displacement delay to hit the target) ;
• The duration corresponding to the exposure of the targets (d4).
It is also significant to appreciate the capacity of intervention (mitigation measures,
safety services...), which can influence the times previously quoted overall.
In order to improve the understanding the temporal decomposition which has been
just made, we can study a representation in bow tie (which characterises the
development of a scenario of accident) to carry out a conventional analysis of the
kinetics of accident :
SCENARIO
Current Event b Prevention
Pre-aecidental kinetic taking into account in
safety report
Post-accidental kinetics to characterise within the
framework of LUP and emergency planning
Figure 2-1 : Illustration of the kinetic on the bow tie
O This illustration is generic, and must be adapted to each phenomenon ; The
illustration is not on the scale. The rise to power of the phenomenon could be
extremely reduced ;
a The attack of the targets and the exposure could begin from the start of the
phenomenon until its development. The attack of the targets (time necessary to
the appearance of an effect on the targets) could be immediate.
3. Accident scenario prioritization
The following definitions will be used:
a Pre-accidental phase : former to the release of the potential of danger (between
the initiating event and the release of the potential of danger) ;
a Post-accidental phase : posterior phase with the release of the potential of
danger.
3.1 Scenario prioritisation to the pre-accidental kinetic
To illustrate this approach, the following table shows some various phenomena likely
to occur on an industrial site and exposes, on the basis of lessons learned from past
accident, the order of magnitude of associated times (in the order ascending of the
duration).
Dangerous Phenomena Initial Event Pre-accidental duration
BLEVE Thermal flux heating the vessel
Around 10 minutes - Depends
on the chemical product,
conditioning, fire power, vessel
resistance, etc.
Boil-over Vessel Fire Hours
Table 3-1 : Pre-accidental kinetic of the various phenomena (e.g)
3.2 Scenario prioritisation to the post-accidental kinetic
The following table presents some various phenomena likely to occur on a factory
site and exposes the order of magnitude of associated times with the development of
the phenomenon, its duration, and the associated effects.
•„ * - . JI . -JC " • . V ' a * ) . <«-»
Jet Fire Immediate : as soon asproduct ignition Several minutes to hours Th + Tox
Toxic release Immediate : as soon asleak Several minutes to hours Tox
Pool Fire Immediate : as soon asproduct ignition Several minutes to hours Th + Tox
Warehouse Fire Immediate : as soon asproduct ignition Several minutes to hours Th + Tox
Table 3-2 : Post-accidental kinetic of the various phenomena (e.g)
7
 P - overPressure ; Th -Thermal ; Tox -Toxic ; M-Missile
3.3 Duration to reach the targets
The following table presents the time necessary to the emergence of a physical effect






(propagation at the speed of sound)
Immediate
(propagation at the speed of light)
Could be long (Depends of meteorological
conditions and emission duration)
Depends of explosion localisation
Instantaneous
Phenomena duration to hours
Could be long (depends of phenomena duration
& chemical product characteristics)
Instantaneous
Table 3-1 : Time length to exposure & exposure time length of various effects
3.4 First Conclusions
The phenomena could be characterised in several categories :
• « Very quick » phenomena : VCE & chemical decomposition ;
• « quick but delayed» phenomena : BLEVE ;
• « quick but very delayed» phenomena : BOIL-OVER ;
• long lasting phenomena but immediate effects : pool fire, jet fire, warehouse
fire or confined fire, toxic release.
The case of chemical product decomposition is particular because the phenomena
depends of chemical reaction conditions. It could be classified like a "very quick
phenomena" or like a "quick but delayed phenomena".
4. Scenario prioritization taking into account safety services capabilities
The different delays for the safety services intervention could be decomposed in [2-3] :
0 Alert : delay between the release of the potential of hazard and the event
knowledge (type of phenomena and location ) - a minima 10 minutes ;
© The movement of the Intervention Services on site : delay between the event
knowledge and the effective arrival on the site - around 10 minutes ;
€) The Intervention at different levels :
(a) To limit phenomena occurrence8 ;
(b) And/or to limit its severity1 ;
(c) And/or for the "targetextraction" : (population confinement, evacuation) - a
minima 15 minutes.
8
 These last two times are around 15 minutes for the installation of the means, time for which it is
necessary to add the effective time of intervention. In addition, they get along only in the absence of
victims which in, all the cases will be treated in priority
Three additional delays could be defined characterising the capacity of intervention of
the public helps according to :
a ds : delay of the implementation of mitigation means before the
phenomena occurrence ; it consists of (O + © + © a) and will be
obligatorily higher than 45 minutes ;
a de : delay of the implementation of mitigation means in order to limit the
phenomenon severity ; it consists of (O + © + ©b) ; according to the
availability of the means, it can be put in prospect in a field ranging
between d2 and beyond ds ;
a dy : delay of the target extraction ; it consists of (O + © + ©c) and could
begin as of the occurrence of the critical event (CE) and beyond d4 ;
di - occurrence delay d2 - phenomena d3 - target d4 - target
development attack exposure
Q 5 -Mitigation measures u « - Mitigation measures to limit phenomena severity
before phenomena occurrence
d7 .targetextraction (confinement- evacuation)
Figure 4 -1 - De l ay organisation
5. Propositions to characterize the kinetic taking into account safety
practices
In comparison with these elements, INERIS proposed, with regard to the kinetic, the
following approach :
a Each phenomena has to be characterised according to the delay di to
d4 (except the boil-over to which the pre-acci dental dynamic will be
considered) ;
a the justified choice of the delay ds, according to the real capacity of local
intervention is likely to "downgrade" several phenomena for a value of dl
higher than 45 minutes ;
a the justified choice of the delay d6 is also likely to "downgrade" several
phenomena in terms of severity ;
a the use of d? will make it possible to differentiate the selection from the
scenarios to be used for LUP or emergency planning.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, the knowledge of the phenomena kinetic decomposition is useful to
improve the definition of :
a The safety barriers as well as them dimensioning. These barriers can be
technical or organisational and depending of the local context.
a The actions to decrease the targets vulnerability.
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